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A Farewell to Innocence? African Youth and Violence in 
the Twenty-First Century
Charles Ugochukwu Ukeje, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
Akin Iwilade, Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria
This is a broad examination of the issue of youth violence in twenty-first-century Africa, looking at the context within which a youth culture of violence has 
evolved and attempting to understand the underlining discourses of hegemony and power that drive it. The article focuses specifically on youth violence as a 
political response to the dynamics of (dis)empowerment, exclusion, and economic crisis and uses (post)conflict states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria 
to explain not just the overall challenge of youth violence but also the nature of responses that it has elicited from established structures of authority. Youth vi-
olence is in many ways an expression of youth agency in the context of a social and economic system that provides little opportunity.
When a bird perches on a long rope, neither the bird nor the 
rope can expect stability.
Yoruba proverb
1. Introduction: Youth and Agency in the African Public Space
In most parts of modern Africa, the relationship between 
youth and society can be described by the metaphor of the 
bird and the rope. Like the rope, African society is faced 
with a growing youth population (the bird) whose very ex-
pression of “being” (the simple, and perhaps even necess-
ary, act of perching) is potentially destabilizing for all 
concerned. Many societies in contemporary Africa are only 
now coming to terms with concerns that the youth ques-
tion, and its potentially destabilizing impact on social re-
lations, may be replacing ethnicity and religion as a more 
powerful framework for explaining dynamics of social 
change on the continent. This concern is neither unfounded 
nor misplaced, not just because more than two-thirds of the 
continent’s population are under the age of 35 years – mak-
ing it the most “youthful” continent (Richards 2002), but 
more importantly because the variety of youth en-
gagements is having significant impacts – for good or bad 
–in many communities. Therefore, rather than merely fo-
cusing on how society shapes youth and experiences of 
youth, understanding the dynamics of social change in 
 Africa also requires interrogating what De Boeck and Hon-
wanna (2005, 1) refer to as “the way young people in Africa 
reconfigure geographies of exclusion and inclusion.” That 
is, how they navigate the complex tapestry of exclusion in a 
post-colonial state that offers not only little opportunity for 
graduation into adulthood but also makes surviving the 
constraints and incentives of youth extremely difficult.
Using “African youth” as an analytical category, as we do in 
this paper, is not intended to suggest that youth can mean 
the same thing right across a continent as diverse as Africa. 
We acknowledge the diverse historical and material experi-
ences of different African societies and how these may frame 
the way youth and their social roles are configured. In spite 
of this diversity however, there are congruencies that suggest 
that some limited generalization can be generated for ana-
lytical purposes. These congruencies are chiefly located in 
the generally accepted modern history of Africa, particularly 
as it relates to social pressures generated by violent conflict, 
economic crisis, and environmental challenges. These press-
ures appear to shape social responses in similar ways all over 
the continent, and youth is no exception.
To properly situate youth in the context of their en-
gagement with the public space in Africa it is important to 
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find analytical congruencies, and also to broaden the con-
ception of youth to more accurately reflect the realities of 
twenty-first-century Africa. A more accurate notion of 
youth will accommodate four basic perspectives. First, it 
will view youth as a social category within an intergener-
ational discourse. Second, it will place this intergener-
ational discourse within a broader discourse of power, 
authority, and control. Third, it will take due note of the 
shifting nature of the inherent relations of power and con-
trol and how this affects the social notions of youth. Fin-
ally, it will view youth as a lived experience rather than an 
imagined one.
With regard to these four perspectives, it becomes clear, as 
Bayart (1993) demonstrates, that generational categories 
such as childhood, youth, and adulthood are not neutral or 
even natural, but rather a “part of the struggle for influence 
and authority within almost every society” (Christiantine, 
Utas, and Vigh 2006, 11). Related to this struggle is a grow-
ing youth appropriation of the public sphere made possible 
largely by the empowering characteristics of emerging new 
media technologies. As a consequence, youth has become a 
very critical emergent category through which we may 
understand the dynamics of power, influence, and control 
in the emerging African public sphere. As important as 
youth participation in this sphere is, the implications for 
social mobilization and thus socio-political reconstruction, 
as demonstrated by recent youth-led social movements in 
North Africa, is perhaps much more significant. Thus, 
youth agency must be recognized not only as capable of 
freeing young people from dominance by a paternalistic 
and patrimonial system but also as capable of reconfigur-
ing the nature of power within the broader society. It 
should be noted that the apprehensions of states, cor-
porations, and traditional institutions about the agency of 
youth are most deeply embedded in this political im-
plication. Any accurate reading of youth in Africa must 
thus take note of this political ramification and perhaps 
utilize it as a principal framework for analysis.
This paper takes due note of this political ramification and 
pays attention to how the four elements of our con-
ceptualization of youth can help us understand the 
multidimensional challenges facing African youth, as well 
as how these are altering and redefining the scope and con-
tent of their engagements within and with societies on the 
continent. This occurs within the particular context of 
youth-specific experiences of violence and (dis)empower-
ment, particularly in conflict societies like Nigeria, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. This is important as it demonstrates the 
intersection that can be discerned between such experi-
ences and broader questions of identity, economic crisis, 
and human rights in Africa.
The paper is divided into five interconnected sections. 
After the introduction, we take a broad look at the context 
within which “youth” is constructed in Africa. We then go 
on, in the section that follows, to answer the questions of 
“why” and “how,” with respect to youth and violence in 
(post)conflict societies in Africa. We also look at the gen-
dered peculiarities that may sometimes shape the way 
youth engage with and in violence, and the overall im-
plications of all these for the ability of youth to effectively 
participate in the public sphere. In section four, we look at 
the various ways in which African states have responded to 
youth violence and examine what this means for processes 
of social change and politics in Africa. The final section 
summarizes the key arguments and draws attention to im-
portant lessons that may be learnt. These lessons include 
the need to reconfigure social conceptions of youth en-
gagement with violence in ways that take due note of the 
broad context of crisis within which they develop rather 
than focusing on youth violence as an expression of crimi-
nality.
2. Youth and the African Crisis
While being young can be fraught with danger in many so-
cieties around the world, the peculiar African context of 
social deprivation within which many young people in Af-
rica grow up makes the youth experience there particularly 
problematic. Therefore, taking a look at the structural con-
ditions that shape youth experience and provide incentives 
for violent choices in the way they express “self” is critical 
to having a holistic conversation about the “youth prob-
lem.” In other words, beyond youths entering popular dis-
cussions as troublesome citizens – for instance, township 
youths in the heyday of apartheid in South Africa, rarray 
boys in the ghettos of Freetown, egbesu boys in Nigeria’s oil 
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delta, area boys in Lagos, bakassi boys in southeastern Nige-
ria – the circumstances pushing them towards the margins 
of society must also be privileged in social discourse (Ras-
hid 1997; Ukiwo 2002). It is important to understand that 
the discourse on youth in Africa cannot and should not be 
dominated by narratives of violence which oftentimes tend 
to be too narrowly focused on youths as threats while ig-
noring the underlying social meanings of violence, for in-
stance with regard to legitimate claims against an 
authoritarian and incapable state.
For Africa, the social circumstances within which state tyr-
anny and ineptitude develop and which ultimately generate 
youth responses are generally well known. There appears to 
be a consensus in the literature that Africa faces a wide-
spread and deepening crisis of development. Colonialism 
and its continued salience (Amin 2001), Africa’s marginal 
place in the international system (Amin 2001; Bigsten and 
Dureval 2008), and its severe governance deficits (World 
Bank 1981, 2000; Fukuyama 2004) are frequently cited ex-
planations. However, even though the economic numbers 
still remain comparatively low, there is growing optimism 
that Africa is at last showing signs of emerging from its 
underdevelopment. In fact, triumphalist literature has ap-
peared, heralding the “institutionalization of political 
power in Africa” (Posner and Young 2007), the 
strengthening of civil society and democracy (Halperin, 
Siegle, and Weintein 2010), and the growth of its econ-
omies (Soludo 2005). What these suggest is that while there 
appears to be an enduring climate of socio-economic crisis, 
some opportunities for advancement are evident. The 
youth question evolves within this context and is therefore 
shaped by the intersection of crisis and opportunity.
To give clarity to our notion of youth developing within 
the context of crisis and opportunity, one may look to the 
controversial work of Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz 
(1999). In Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument 
they develop the thesis that even though Africa appears to 
be a place of chaos, its social formations have learnt to not 
only manipulate the crisis, but also to appropriate its dis-
courses and patterns for self-advancement. It is in this con-
text that youth in Africa have been able to define 
themselves by finding alternative social spaces for self-ex-
pression within a constraining polity. In this sense, crisis 
(with its informalization of politics, rule of law deficits, 
and progressively weakening value systems) creates oppor-
tunities (for instance for fraud and violence) which when 
taken by youth often generate further crisis. This is illus-
trated by the situation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 
where governance deficits in the area of petroleum refining 
has allowed the emergence of a shadow economy of illegal 
refineries (crudely constructed and with only rudimentary 
technology) controlled by armed youth gangs who steal 
crude oil from pipelines, refine it, and export the products 
along the West African coast. In this regard, youth seize the 
opportunity provided by governance deficits to accumulate 
capital, a significant proportion of which funds militancy 
and criminality in the region. Durham (2000, 113) makes a 
similar point about what she describes as “occult econ-
omies” where the “potency and potential of youth is 
extracted to sustain the power of those in authority while 
young people themselves feel increasingly unable to attain 
the promises of the new economy and society.” In this re-
gard, young people sense the powers they possess for shap-
ing society, albeit in shapes dictated by the elite, and yet feel 
powerless to do anything about their own lives. They thus 
increasingly define themselves by working both within and 
at the same time around the corrupt system.
The failures of governance and statehood in Africa have 
created societies in perpetual crisis within which legal op-
portunities for social mobility are, at best, few. This is the 
case for entire societies, but its expression is surely graver 
for marginalized social categories like children, women, 
and youth.
The implications of social marginalization of youth are 
easily discerned, among other things, in violent conduct 
(Cruise O’Brien 1996; Utas 2005). This exacerbates gener-
ational tensions that often end in further youth exclusion, 
thus creating a vicious cycle of exclusion and resistance.
Anecdotal evidence can shed light on popular appre-
hensions about youth in Africa, in the traditional and/or 
modern contexts, and on how these often lead to social ex-
clusion. In December 2003, a Sierra Leonean academic who 
had lived and worked continuously in Nigeria since 1978, 
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was conferred with a chieftaincy title of Baaluwe (the 
leader of the learned people) by the king of a renowned 
and ancient city in southwest Nigeria. When he was handed 
the oath of office to publicly pledge his allegiance to the 
traditional ruler, the first item on the long list of dos and 
don’ts was that under no circumstance must he conspire 
with or support the youths of the town to undermine the 
traditional ruler. By making this pledge, he committed 
himself to an unwavering loyalty to the traditional mon-
arch, significantly at a time when that institution is con-
temptuously derided as anachronistic in contemporary 
Nigerian politics. He also unwittingly committed himself 
to the defense of a governance structure that not only sees 
the youth as trouble, but also deems it necessary to exclude 
them from governance.
In conditions as described above, where economic ac-
cumulation is extremely difficult, political exclusion and 
social decay are rife, and the structures of the state are 
either too weak or too uninterested to resolve conflict, it is 
not difficult to see the social crucible that forges violent re-
sistance in youth. As the example we gave above suggests, 
even informal avenues for seeking redress and expressing 
opinion appear to be becoming closed to youth, thereby 
driving more and more into violent conduct. Unfor-
tunately, very few societies have subjected themselves to the 
kinds of critical introspection that could lead to sincere and 
open acknowledgements, if not acceptance, of responsibil-
ity for the pitiable ways youths are increasingly falling into 
in contemporary Africa. Rather than critical introspection, 
most societies in Africa are content with merely con-
structing conflicting public images of youth. The first of 
such touts them patronizingly as the hope for the future, the 
other castigating them as nuisances to public order (Waal 
2002, 13). Perhaps the only consolation is that no matter 
the idiom society uses to qualify its youth, there is little 
controversy that at the start of the present millennium, 
youth themselves have become central and strategic to the 
making and unmaking of social order on the continent as 
the experiences of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Tunisia, Libya, the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Moz-
ambique, and Sudan – to mention but a few of the recent 
flashpoints – have clearly demonstrated (Abdullah 1999; 
Richards 1994, 1997; Ukeje 2001; Zegeye 2003; Maxted 
2003; Utas 2003). Indeed, there is concern that African so-
cieties ought to start guarding against a situation where 
their worst apprehensions and fears concerning youth may 
soon metamorphose into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
3. Youth and Conflict in Africa: Violence, Survival and Victimhood
Having provided a broad view of what it means to be 
young in Africa, we can now go on to examine the specific 
question of youth violence. Two broad categories of youth 
violence can be discerned: violence aimed at political goals 
and criminal violence. Except where expressly stated, we 
focus more on violence with political meaning. It should 
be noted however that the line between these two cat-
egories sometimes blurs, as the Niger Delta, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia conflicts show (Kandeh 1999; Ukeje 2001).
Since the mid-1990s at least, one of the defining features of 
the youth discourse in Africa has been an attempt to 
understand the critical interface between youth and violent 
conflicts. This is not out of place, given the unprecedented 
involvement of young people in the civil wars and low in-
tensity conflicts that have erupted in states like Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. Of course young people have al-
ways been involved in violent conflict, with youth forming 
the bulk of the armed forces in most societies; in recent 
times however, they appear to increasingly take on the roles 
of instigators and leaders of violence rather than mere fol-
lowers (youth-led social movements like the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, MEND, for example, 
are notorious for violent engagement with the state and 
multinational oil companies). It is possible to establish a 
causal link between this emerging youth role in violence 
and broader questions about social decomposition, econ-
omic crisis, and the critical intersection of the local and the 
global (El-Kenk 1996; Macdonald 1997; Comarroff and 
Comarroff 2005; Aluiagba 2009). Deconstructing youth 
participation in violence in Africa is therefore incomplete 
without an engagement with this important phenomenon: 
not only does it demonstrate the deep-seated crisis of 
(dis)empowerment facing many societies, it also provides 
crucial insights into the way youth navigate this complex 
terrain and the weapons or tools they use to do so. The 
very nature of many of these conflicts, particularly their 
disproportionate linkage to resource management and 
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wealth distribution issues, may be a reflection of the at-
traction of accumulation to a youthful population that has 
long been excluded from productive engagement within 
the formal economies. One should however acknowledge, 
in the first instance, that there is a gendered perception of 
violence that takes note of gender-specific experiences of 
youth violence and methods of navigating the dangerous 
terrains created by conflict. In the first place, it should be 
noted that gender is all too often conflated with women 
and girls. As Amani El Jack (2003, 6) notes, however, 
gender simply “refers to perceptions of appropriate be-
havior, appearance and attitude for women and men aris-
ing from social and cultural expectations.” As a 
consequence, gendered perceptions of youth in violence 
must take cognizance of the local context and under-
standings of gender. Generally perceived notions of youth 
in relation to violence are, however, almost exclusively 
male. This is not unconnected to the gendered delineation 
of roles in conflict societies, which regards female identity 
in violent conflict in the context of victimhood. This blan-
ket assumption of victimhood however often ignored the 
crucial role that women play in the outbreak, management, 
and resolution of violent conflict. As Iwilade (2011, 27) 
notes, “an ethnography of social tactics in conflict situ-
ations easily counters the reductionist portrayals of women 
as merely passive victims of conflicts.” There are good 
examples of young women in Liberia and Sierra Leone who 
acted as combatants in civil wars and some, like Colonel 
Black Diamond of the Women’s Auxiliary Corps in Liberia, 
even commanded elite units (Utas 2005, 404).
Notwithstanding the disproportionate emphasis on young 
men in the discourse on youth violence, there is still some 
analytical value to examining youth violence in socially 
separate but mutually reinforcing gender crucibles. Even 
though disempowerment is a shared misfortune of many 
African youths irrespective of gender, one may still discern 
differentiated experiences across gender divisions. For one, 
young women have unique pre-conflict experiences of dis-
empowerment that provide important insights into how 
they respond to the dynamics of violence. As Brett and 
Sprecht (2004, 87) note, young women often participate in 
organized armed violence primarily to escape domestic vi-
olence, abuse, and poverty rather than in defense of relig-
ious or ethnic interests as can often be the case for young 
men. This indicates that female disempowerment and mar-
ginalization by a patriarchal system is a major reason 
young women participate in violent public conduct. This 
does not however provide adequate explanation for the 
methods by which they navigate the geography of violence.
In deconstructing youth participation in violence it is help-
ful to answer the questions of “why” and “how.” “Why” 
helps us to understand the specific factors that draw youths 
into violent conduct while “how” explains the tactics and 
tools with which they navigate the dangerous geography of 
violent conflict. Both questions collectively provide import-
ant insights into the dynamic engagement of youth with vi-
olence in Africa and the implications for social change.
To address the question of “why,” we can apply Murphy’s 
four models of youth participation in violence (2003, 
64–66) and find appropriate parallels within contemporary 
Africa. The first is the “coerced youth model” which views 
youth as being brutally coerced into a (violent) military 
role and thus as passive victims of social upheaval. This 
model has been useful in providing some explanation for 
the “child soldier” phenomenon in Sierra Leone and Lib-
eria (Richards 1994, 1997). The second is the “revol-
utionary youth model” which views youth as rebelling 
against political and economic marginalization. This 
model has been used to rationalize the engagement of 
youths within social movements involved in violent con-
frontation with the state/multinational oil coalition in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Ifeka 2006). The two models 
differ in what they choose to emphasize about youth par-
ticipation in violence. In the first model, youth is denied 
agency as they are framed as unwilling or choiceless victims 
of a brutal and coercive apparatus of violence. The second 
fully acknowledges the agency of youth, making sure to 
point out their deliberate and rational rejection of margi-
nalizing social systems and their creative responses to the 
opportunities created by social conflict.
The third is the “delinquent youth model” which views 
youth participants in violent conflicts not as revolutionary 
idealists but as “alienated and economically dispossessed 
opportunists exploiting the economic spoils of social tur-
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moil” (Murphy 2003, 64). In this case, young people engage 
in violence in defense of no higher ideal, but rather for the 
heady adventure of violence itself (the West Side Boys in 
Liberia for instance; Abdullah 1998) or for the criminal 
benefits that can be derived from conflict (some criminal 
elements of insurgency movements in the Niger Delta for 
instance). This model is reflective of traditional notions of 
youth as a period that is carefree, rebellious, contemptuous 
of authority, and generally mischievous. It follows a path 
slightly different from the earlier two, straddling the realms 
of agency and agenthood. Agenthood here refers to the state 
of being an agent: lacking independent capacity to take 
decisions without direction from others. While it acknowl-
edges the choice of youth to participate in delinquent viol-
ence, it frames that choice as natural and thus demeans it.
The fourth is the “youth clientelism model” which em-
phasizes how youth manage their dependency and agency 
within “an institutional structure of repressive patrimo-
nialism in which their subordination to adults is based on a 
cruel mixture of brutality, personal benevolence and reci-
procity” (Murphy 2003, 65). This model is markedly dif-
ferent from the three described earlier because it focuses on 
an extraneous factor to explain youth agency in violence: 
institutions built through client-patron relations. This 
model is particularly appropriate for analyzing relations 
between young combatants and the commanders who re-
cruit, mentor, and discipline them within the ranks of rebel 
movements. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are, 
of course, poster children for this phenomenon.
The other question of “how” relates primarily to methods 
and tools for navigating the complex geographies of violent 
conflict in Africa. It is important to understand that the 
tactics with which youth engage in or navigate violent situ-
ations cannot be explained with a monocultural or fossil-
ized lens. It often involves a series of constantly adjusted 
tactics, developed in response to the constraints and incen-
tives created, on the one hand by a hostile socio-economic 
context, and on the other by the immediate consequences 
of conflict.
One of the main features of youth violence in Africa was 
insightfully analyzed by Caroline Ifeka (2006) in a study of 
the intersection between religion and violence. In that 
study, she developed a framework for analyzing youth cul-
tures of resistance and violence in the context of customary 
and world religions in which old and new gods are import-
ant sources of ideological resistance (Ifeka 2006, 721). In 
this context, Ifeka (2006, 725) invariably builds on the “rev-
olutionary youth model” to describe the way religious 
identities are appropriated as a tool to navigate the complex 
terrains of violence and resistance. By plugging into relig-
ious rituals and rhetoric, youth take advantage of violence 
and thus gain legitimacy for an essentially aberrant social 
form. By purporting to engage in violence on behalf of, in 
the name of, or through the agency of religion and its rit-
uals, youth gain public support or at least acquiescence for 
what is often essentially violent resistance to a hostile patri-
monial system. This method of gaining legitimacy for 
youth violence is easily discernible in Islamic revivalist 
movements in northern Nigeria and among the egbesu 
warriors of the oil communities in the Niger Delta. Of 
course, it must be noted that this method is often in-
tricately connected to broader questions of culture, ecology, 
and economics, especially in the case of violent resistance 
in resource-rich communities like the Niger Delta.
In the context of major armed conflicts like civil wars, viol-
ence is in itself often a method to navigate the violent ter-
rain created by war. In this regard, many young people 
simply join armed groups as a way of gaining some pro-
tection from brutal and unforgiving armies (that are some-
times the very same ones that vulnerable youth join). It is 
thus often a case of “if you can’t beat them, join them.” 
This tactic for navigating violence has been thoroughly ad-
dressed within the literature. The works of Utas (2003, 
2005), MacMullin and Loughry (2004), and Murphy 
(2003) are particularly rich in this with regard to Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, while Ukeje (2001) and Obi (2006) make 
similar points about the Niger Delta. As MacMullin and 
Loughry (2004) note in the case of young women, escaping 
the heightened vulnerability of women and girls to violent 
abuse during armed conflict is one of the key motivations 
that drive many of them to enlist. As McKay and Mazurana 
(2004) also note, during the 1976–1992 civil war in Moz-
ambique, many young girls joined FRELIMO to get away 
from the rural areas, to improve their education or career 
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opportunities, and to expand gender roles for women (is-
sues that had become more difficult as a direct con-
sequence of violent conflict). What these cases show is that 
violence is in itself sometimes a tactic to avoid violence or 
its consequences.
While the two navigation tactics discussed above are by no 
means exhaustive, they provide an adequate description of 
the broad scope and ingenuity of youth encounters with vi-
olent conflict. The implications of growing organized and 
unorganized violence on the psyche of youth and in-
variably on the society itself are dire. For one, youth viol-
ence deepens the intergenerational debate as well as the 
conflict therein, as clearly manifested in the Mungiki move-
ment in Kenya.1 It also deepens apprehension about the fu-
ture of traditional notions of youth and adulthood, as well 
as raising critical questions about how to find the right bal-
ance between these notions and the new forms of social re-
lations imposed by a rapidly changing global capitalist 
system. Some of these new forms include changes in the 
political economy of accumulation as a consequence of a 
growing emphasis on skills now more typically possessed 
by youth (for example software engineering, social net-
working, and so on). With violent conflict in Africa now 
increasingly erupting as a consequence of youth dissatisfac-
tion with their chances for advancement, rather than dis-
agreements within the traditional elite structures (Libya, 
Egypt, and to a lesser extent Nigeria; Boko Haram in the 
North and MEND in the Niger Delta are important 
examples), creating a constructive outlet for youth agency 
has become a national security concern across Africa.
While the recent youth-inspired violent eruptions in North 
Africa no doubt happened within specific social contexts, 
this could, one way or the other, be replicated in many 
other African countries. It is common therefore to see the 
discourses around new protest movements in diverse places 
across sub-Saharan Africa, from Nigeria to Mozambique, 
Kenya and Ghana, taking a cue from and compared with 
the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and 
Egypt. This is an indication that these violent youth-led 
movements have entered into youth imagination across Af-
rica. Such imagination is, however, not as important as the 
growing youth perception, no doubt also fuelled by the 
successes in North Africa, that such movements can ac-
tually bring about monumental changes in society and 
politics in many countries. This is the most ominous for 
established patterns of authority and control on the conti-
nent. Rather than simply working to expand opportunities 
for youth, it appears that the fear of youth losing their “in-
nocence” is now becoming the discourse around which pa-
ternalistic social systems across Africa constructs responses 
to the “youth problem.”
4. Farewell to Innocence: Responses to Youth Violence in Africa
Because the more popular idioms relating to contemporary 
African youth present them as “troublemakers,” public 
policy interventions have focused on youths as a set of 
“bads,” mostly with disastrous consequences. At the 
broader level, a major consequence is that the dominant 
public idiom continues to cloud societal judgments on 
youth and youth-related matters. More specifically, such 
dominant idioms have totally diminished the remarkable 
enterprise and resilience of young people at critical periods 
of society-building and nation-building processes; for in-
stance, the contributions of youths towards decolonization 
in the 1960s and their popular roles in the re-
democratization projects in different countries from the 
early 1990s. Unfortunately, public discourse tends to sup-
press, ignore, or devalue such contributions of youths to 
socio-political development in different African countries. 
Quite often, the eventual beneficiaries of such devel-
opments end up distancing themselves from or working 
against youth aspirations and needs. This was the situation 
soon after young people played a frontline role in the de-
colonization struggles, after which the post-independence 
1 The Mungiki Movement in Kenya was a youth 
organisation that was notorious for its violent ma-
nipulation of generational conflicts and discourses 
during and after the 2002 general elections. A com-
prehensive analysis is provided by Kagwanja (2005).
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socio-political project was hijacked by the ruling elites in 
different countries for personal and group aggrand-
izement. It still is the situation after youths spearheaded the 
socio-political “revolution” that led to the collapse of one-
party civilian or military regimes and the process of re-
democratization and democratic consolidation.
Some of the ex-combatants interviewed during earlier 
fieldwork in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2001 captured the exas-
peration and anger associated with this “use and dump” 
politics perfected by Charles Taylor’s regime. As one of 
them put it, “you cannot use a truck to build a house and 
not allow it even pass by after completion,” meaning that 
after all the sacrifices they made during years of fighting in 
the bush, they would not accept their neglect by the Taylor 
regime. This narrative of angst certainly played a major 
part in the emergence of a new rebel group, Liberians 
United for Reconstruction and Development (LURD) in 
2000, and in the manner in which it successfully mobilized 
disgruntled ex-combatants to launch successful attacks that 
contributed to the downfall and exile of Charles Taylor. 
Presently, a similar undercurrent of neglect and disillusion-
ment is driving the recent resurgence of gangsterism and 
violence in Nigeria’s oil region, especially in Port Harcourt. 
The main gangs terrorizing the city started their careers as 
political thugs to help different factions achieve electoral 
victory during the 2003 gubernatorial elections in the state. 
With little or no use for them after that election, political 
patronage for the gangs dried up – but not before they had 
reformed as organized armed groups engaged in oil bun-
kering and threatening public order and stability.
What the above suggests is that youth is only considered 
relevant by society to the extent that it serves the narrow 
interests of the political and social elite. This exploitative 
attitude to youth feeds into the discourses of generation 
and hegemony that shape state responses to youth violence.
These responses can be grouped into three broad and in-
terconnected areas: co-option, exclusion and repression. 
African states have mostly responded to youth pressures by 
employing all of these strategies to varying degrees and 
within specific contexts. Depending on the overall demo-
cratic character of governance in the country concerned, 
states have shown willingness to clamp down on youth 
protests and protest cultures and also to shape the youth 
discourse in ways that frame them as at best troublesome.
The 2009 amnesty deal for militants in the Niger Delta is 
an interesting policy that shows the deliberate use of all 
three strategies in response to incidences of youth violence 
and resistance. As background, it should be noted that re-
sistance in the oil-producing region of the Niger Delta has 
a long-drawn history rooted in the character and activities 
of European foreign capital and colonial rule over several 
centuries. This is the case if one considers the common 
thread that connects different phases of social disorder in 
the region since at least the sixteenth century (Okwe-
chime, 2011; Ukeje, 2011a, 2011b). Since the discovery of 
crude oil in commercial quantities in Oloibiri in 1958, the 
Niger Delta has grown to become the heart of the Ni-
gerian economy, contributing about 80 percent of all fed-
eral revenue. This centrality of oil to the Nigerian 
economy and, perhaps more importantly, to the revenue 
accruing to the state, has led social convulsions in the re-
gion to be construed as direct threats to national security 
and even to the very survival of the country. It has also 
bred social agitations and violent resistance by oil com-
munities who consider their meager receipts from the pro-
ceeds of oil exploitation grossly unfair and unacceptable. 
At the heart of resistance to the state in the Niger Delta are 
the youth who challenge the state/multinational oil com-
pany coalitions and demand a greater share of the re-
sources accruing from oil exploration and exploitation. 
The generational dimension of the crisis further com-
plicates the situation. In this case, traditional patterns of 
power and authority are increasingly being violently ren-
egotiated, to the point where young people appear to have 
lost confidence in the ability of adults to effectively repre-
sent and defend their interests.
In response to widespread youth-led violence that under-
mined the vital oil industry, the government instituted an 
amnesty program that was meant to demobilize, disarm, 
and rehabilitate militants in the region. A critical assess-
ment of the actual working of the policy reveals key indi-
cators of the three response strategies mentioned earlier: 
repression, co-option and exclusion.
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In the first place, the discourses that culminated in the am-
nesty policy were largely shaped by an elite structure that 
invariably excluded the youth. Obi and Rustad (2011, 204) 
report that the amnesty program was not the outcome of 
open negotiations or a formal peace agreement between 
the government and militants; instead, they were done at 
the highest levels of government, and involved members of 
the Niger Delta elite/elders and top government officials of 
Niger Delta origin negotiating with militia commanders. 
This implies that from the start, the amnesty was a tool of 
exclusion rather than inclusion.
We can easily discern a second policy of co-option in the 
way militant commanders were pulled into the embrace of 
the state elite, much to the chagrin of many of their er-
stwhile fighters who were inevitably left in the cold. As Da-
vidheisser and Nyiyiana (2010) note, “while ex-militia 
‘commanders’ enjoyed state patronage and largesse, their 
erstwhile foot soldiers in designated camps complained of 
the poor living conditions, lack of training facilities and 
programmes and delayed payment of allowances.” This 
sort of co-option has left many former militia commanders 
turning into mouth-pieces and defenders of the state (and 
the crop of political elites who now control it) against 
whom they had fought so hard. In fact, there are indi-
cations that many of these ex-militia now provide security 
services to oil companies, defending them against pro-
testers.
The third element, repression, is also evident in the am-
nesty program and is perhaps best illustrated by the con-
tinued militarization of the region. The presence of the 
Joint Task Force, the armed security force charged with 
maintaining “order” in the region, is a constant reminder 
not only to the now co-opted militants, but also to their ex-
cluded counterparts, of the might of the state and its will-
ingness to use force to achieve its goals. It is no surprise 
that since the amnesty program was launched in 2009, 
there have been reports of indiscriminate extrajudicial kill-
ings and harassment of youth all over the region. Similar 
patterns can be found in DDR projects in Liberia and Sier-
ra Leone (MacMullin and Loughry 2004; Utas 2003) and in 
attempts at resolving the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Northern Nigeria (Adesoji 2009).
What these portend for youths is undoubtedly far-
reaching. As opportunities for advancement and success 
fade away, Argenti (2002, 145) reminds us: “as local tradi-
tional orders become increasingly intermeshed with 
national political orders that have lost all legitimacy, young 
people are challenged to find alternative forms of represen-
tation.” Two of these alternative forms of youth represen-
tation for example, the growing socialization of youths into 
the informal sector and youth attraction to radical religion 
(Spinks: 2002), are not only producing distinctive sociali-
zation outcomes but are themselves complicating the ma-
trix of order and stability in contemporary Africa. 
Regarding the socialization of youths into the informal sec-
tor, for instance, the process seemed to have been aided, if 
not triggered, by declining family (household) incomes 
consequent upon the economic crises of the 1980 and after. 
Such informalization processes are creating street-level so-
cializations, invariably also weakening the tenuous rela-
tionship among youth and between youth and family, 
youth and society, and youth and government. With 
shrinking access to subsidized socio-economic oppor-
tunities, the resilience of the family as the most basic unit 
for value creation, moral affection, and individual pro-
tection becomes threatened and too functionally weak to 
perform well. This adulteration is compounded by the 
harsh consequences of the present neo-liberal economic re-
gime, particularly those associated with globalization 
(Meagher 2003). Another factor is what Ly described as the 
“eclipse of those traditional forms of solidarity that large 
kinship groups had generated and sustained” over decades 
in the continent (1988). As more young people achieve so-
cial puberty, therefore, they are confronted with the “fact of 
life” that they may not have the socio-economic where-
withal to live through this difficult phase of life, at least not 
independently, and are thus encouraged to evolve into a 
culture of violence and impunity.
5. Conclusion
What we have done above is to take a broad look at the 
context within which youth violence has developed in Afri-
ca, understanding it as both a failure of governance and a 
strategy for survival. Four models of youth participation in 
violence can be easily discerned in Africa. They include 
“coerced youth” (which denies youth agency by focusing 
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on factors that force youth into violence), “revolutionary 
youth” (which acknowledges youth agency and situates vi-
olence in state decay), “delinquent youth” (which views 
youth as economically dispossessed opportunists exploiting 
social turmoil), and “youth clientelism,” which focuses on 
how institutionalized client-patron structures shape youth 
engagement with violence. We also show that youth par-
ticipation in violence is often a series of constantly adjusted 
tactics developed in response to constraints and incentives 
created by a hostile socio-economic context and the im-
mediate consequences of conflict. We identify religious 
rhetoric as one key normative framework that has been ex-
ploited by youth to rationalize violence for and on behalf of 
“faith” and show that violence is often, in itself, a tactic to 
escape the implications of violent conflict. We also demon-
strate the broad use of cooption, exclusion, and repression 
by the state in response to youth resistance and violence.
The “youth problem” thus flows from broader social crises 
faced by the state in Africa. The challenge is therefore 
chiefly about how to reconstruct African society (and the 
state) in ways that address the youth crisis as a devel-
opmental problem within a holistic framework. In Liberia, 
there is a Creole word of wisdom that “bad bush no dey for 
throway bad pikin,” literally meaning that there is no bad 
bush to throw away a bad child. This simply means that 
one cannot solve a problem by simply wishing it away. In 
the context of our discussion, this implies that Africa can-
not afford to bid farewell to the innocence of youth, but 
rather needs to acknowledge, accommodate, and come to 
terms with the challenge they represent for the youth, in 
the first instance, and the society at large. A major point in 
this paper is therefore that the “problem” of youth is symp-
tomatic of deeper and festering challenges facing African 
societies, and must be addressed from this holistic premise. 
It is important however that the symptom be kept separate 
from the cause, as it is the pervasive tendency to lump 
them together that has fueled public concern about the 
“diabolical” exploits of youth and driven denial of their re-
silience. There is an even bigger concern in the twenty-first 
century, especially in the context of challenges posed by 
globalization (Hedley 2001). On the continent today, there 
is now ample evidence that the globalisation process is 
going to bypass, marginalize or completely neglect millions 
of people for several decades to come. For those people, a 
large percentage of whom fall within the social category of 
youth, according to Gus Speth, as cited by Agarwal (1998), 
“poverty is a denial of the most basic of all human rights: 
the Right to Life.” A new preoccupation in national, conti-
nental, and global policy debate and action should there-
fore focus on improving the quality and dissemination of 
human security, especially for the most marginalized and 
vulnerable social categories in the world.
There is a sound conviction that young people could reach 
their maximum potential without migrating to cities or en-
gaging in dangerous social activities if they can secure sub-
sidized access to educational, medical, economic, political, 
social, and cultural resources wherever they are located, 
whether in the rural or urban areas. This approach to 
youth was promoted by the United Nations Food and Agri-
cultural Organization (FAO) between 2000–2005 through 
its program on “rural youth and food security.” According 
to the FAO, this must involve giving them the right training 
and education, supporting programs that ensure gender 
balance, training youths in leadership, communication, and 
group activities, and packaging programs of activities that 
raise the self-esteem of young people, to mention but a few. 
Youth empowerment means expanding the opportunities 
available to young people, taking cognizance of their ideas, 
vision, and skills, and channeling them towards devel-
opment. It is clear that substantial ground still needs to be 
covered before African countries can adequately make 
sense of the concerns, yearnings, and aspirations of their 
youths, and turn these into the energy and drive necessary 
to claim the twenty-first century.
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